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Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in Copenhagen
• Ian M. McGregor* Civil society participation in global environmental and other arenas of transnational politics, particularly in open international institutions such as the UNFCCC at COP-15, involves both insider and outsider coalitions and strategies. 1 Insider strategies seek to inºuence government ofªcials directly through lobbying. Outsider strategies use demonstrations, media and other activism to put public pressure on government ofªcials. 2 As a civil society representative at Copenhagen COP-15, I offer an alternative interpretation of the major causes of disenfranchisement to Fisher's. 3 According to Fisher, "the addition of the climate justice movement to the repertoire of action at this round of negotiations ended up leaving civil society out in the cold." 4 Fisher claims that three forces led to the disenfranchisement of civil society at COP-15: increased registration, poor planning and "the merging of movements." 5 While poor planning was clearly an issue, this paper demonstrates that the other forces of increased registration and what Fisher calls the "merging of movements" contributed to more effective participation and inºuence by civil society, particularly environmental and climate justice groups. Civil society groups did not contribute to the development of the Copenhagen Accord; many supported the disenfranchised countries that rejected the Accord as inadequate and undemocratic. 
Insider and Outsider Coalitions and Strategies at COP-15
During the ªrst week of negotiations, there were no restrictions on registered NGO delegates' access to the Bella Center in Copenhagen where COP-15 was held. At the Bella Center Metro station, civil society groups were protesting and distributing information to the large number of government and other delegates arriving at and leaving the negotiations. Although, as is usual in the UNFCCC negotiations, NGO delegates are not normally allowed access to the formal negotiations on the proposed text, a number of NGO delegates who were members of ofªcial national delegations and other friendly members of national delegations kept interested civil society delegates well informed of the negotiations' progress or lack thereof. The NGO delegates were also lobbying government ofªcials.
On the afternoon of the ªrst Wednesday of COP-15, there was a hastily organized noisy demonstration inside the COP. Videos of this were posted on YouTube. 11 This demonstration was in support of Tuvalu and its powerful, widely applauded, speech supporting its proposed Protocol that morning in the COP Plenary. Later that day, "NGOs from around the world united in voting Tuvalu the ªrst ever winner of Ray of the Day-to be given on rare occasions for actions to substantially advance progress in global climate talks." 12 This was done as part of the well-attended "Fossil of the Day" presentations inside the COP, which were covered by a range of media and had videos were posted online. This illustrates one of the many ways that civil society inside the COP linked with civil society outside both in Copenhagen and across the world via modern communications technology.
Restrictions on the number of NGO delegates allowed in started during the second week and became more severe towards the end of that week. I was one of only 300 NGO delegates that received a pass for the ªnal Thursday and Friday due to a ªre restriction limit of 15,000 people. A large contingent of government delegates and staff accompanied the 120 heads of state attending the ªnal stages. 13 There were, however, many more than 300 NGO delegates with access for the ªnal two days, because when the restrictions were announced, many governments added key NGO delegates to their ofªcial delegations. At a UNFCCC meeting with the NGO constituency focal points, the UNFCCC noted that on that second Wednesday, 3,000 additional delegates were registered to take part in the meeting, 14 mostly NGO delegates who were to have been excluded. NGO delegates were added to the US and Australian ofªcial national delegations. 15 I have been told but have been unable to conªrm that China added all the Chinese NGO delegates to its ofªcial delegation. I can, however, ªnd among the ªnal list of ofªcial Chinese delegates, two representatives from Greenpeace and one from WWF. 16 As a result of NGO exclusion, many NGO representatives had more privileged access as they were members of government delegations. The ªnal number of delegates registered under ofªcial government delegations rose from the 8,041 initially reported by the UNFCCC 16 to 10,591, 17 indicating that over 2,500 NGO delegates may have become government delegates.
Fisher said the call to storm the Bella Center posted on the internet "con- Fisher 2010 , 13. 17. UNFCCC 2010 tributed to the decision to limit access to NGO delegations." 18 The issues leading to the restrictions had more to do with the ªre restriction capacity limit and security concerns, with 120 world leaders attending. The Danish security forces were well set up to prevent any efforts to storm the venue.
Disenfranchisement and the Copenhagen Accord
As Dimitrov documents, COP-15 "was a failure whose magnitude exceeded our worst fears, and the resulting Copenhagen Accord was a desperate attempt to mask that failure." 19 Disenfranchisement of much of global society, both countries and civil society was manifest in the process that resulted in the Copenhagen Accord.
A recent report, based on unauthorized audio recordings, of the negotiations on the ªnal day of the COP between the leaders of 25 countries convened by the Danish Prime Minister documents the deadlock on a draft agreement. 20 Not only was civil society disenfranchised by these negotiations, so were many of the 100 national leaders and the lead negotiators of other countries not represented in this select group. The drafts of the ªnal declaration under discussion by the select group included provisions not only for limiting the rise of global temperatures to 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2050, but, unlike the ªnal Copenhagen Accord, they also indicated how this might be achieved. There was mention of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80 percent by 2050 and even the possibility of a mid-term goal by 2020. 21 When the group of 25 failed to reach agreement, President Obama agreed with the leaders of China, India, Brazil and South Africa a minimalist agreement with no reference to speciªc emission reduction targets, which became the Copenhagen Accord. In this ªnal stage, even the EU was excluded from the process. 22 This ªnal act of disenfranchisement enabled President Obama to try to claim progress by announcing the Copenhagen Accord at 10.30pm on 18 December, the ªnal scheduled day of the meeting. He asserted that we have "made a meaningful and unprecedented breakthrough here in Copenhagen. For the ªrst time in history all major economies have come together to accept their responsibility to take action to confront the threat of climate change." 23 At 11pm, although civil society representation in the COP was diminished, CAN International held a press conference, webcast both in the COP and outside, declaring the Copenhagen Accord a "non-deal." 24 4 • Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in Copenhagen 18. Fisher 2010 , 15. 19. Dimitrov 2010 , 18. 20. Rapp, Schwägerl, and Traufetter 2010 . 21. Becker 2009 . 22. Rapp, Schwägerl, and Traufetter 2010 Mexico 25 and Australia 26 (both members of the group of 25) held press conferences that were supportive of the Accord. The EU's press conference reºected its concerns about the weakness of the Copenhagen Accord and was less positive, noting "this was not a perfect agreement" and "it will not solve the climate threat." 27 The Danish Prime Minister presented the Copenhagen Accord, "developed by a representative group of leaders from all groups around the world" to the ªnal plenary of the COP at 3am on 19 December. 28 Disenfranchisement was one of two major concerns then expressed by some countries. Seven countries openly opposed the Accord in the plenary as "undemocratically created, and too weak to save the world." 29 Tuvalu was the ªrst country to object, indicating that announcing a deal by press conference "is disrespectful of the UN processes" and that we were "being offered money to betray our people and our future, however, our future is not for sale." The latter statement generated applause in the plenary, even at 3.15am. 30 Venezuela, Cuba, Sudan and Bolivia supported Tuvalu. Bolivia commented that it was "most surprised and offended by the methodology that has been used," that millions of people are threatened by climate change and "we are being told that we have one hour to decide on the rights of those millions of people, we do not believe that this is respectful." 31 Nicaragua then proposed an alternative set of decisions for adoption that included a requirement that the developed country parties to the Kyoto Protocol negotiate the details of second commitment period by June 2010. Following this proposal, the meeting was suspended. 32 The eventual outcome was that the Copenhagen Accord was not adopted but only noted. This occurred after over ªve hours of further discussion and following the replacement of the Danish Prime Minister as Chair of the COP. 32 The phrase used-"take note"-merely acknowledges the existence of the Copenhagen Accord. Without strong support from environmental and climate justice groups for a fair, ambitious and binding outcome from COP-15, the seven countries may not have been willing to challenge the US, EU, China, India and Brazil, which had all endorsed the Copenhagen Accord.
At COP-15, there was the full emergence of a new and powerful alliance of environmental and climate justice groups with the vulnerable countries most at risk from climate change. This alliance had begun at the Bali COP in 2007 and played a major role at COP-15. 33 Disenfranchisement was indeed widespread at Ian M. McGregor • 5 25. UNFCCC 2009f. 26. UNFCCC 2009e. 27. UNFCCC 2009d . 28. UNFCCC 2009b . 29. Dimitrov 2010 , 20. 30. UNFCCC 2009d . 31. UNFCCC 2009d . 32. UNFCCC 2009c . Presentation by Cam Walker, Friends of the Earth International, From Global Crisis To Green Future conference, Sydney, 29 May 2010.
COP-15, but it was not conªned to civil society that had many actors working cooperatively with state actors and in the latter stages, some who became ofªcial government delegates. Many were pushing for a fair, ambitious and binding outcome from the COP. Regrettably, this outcome was not achieved.
